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This paper explores individual motives for volunteering. The analysis is based on the
interpretation of volunteering as a consumption good (consumption model) or as a mean to
increase individual’s own human capital (investment model). We present an econometric
framework taking into account self selection into volunteering and simultaneity between
the volunteering decision and the determination of income in order to test these two models
and to identify the underlying motives.
We ﬁnd strong statistical evidence for the investment model with a highly robust and
signiﬁcant impact of volunteering on the wage rate. Within the framework of the in-
vestment model it turns out that the number of volunteering hours plays a major role
in explaining this wage premium. This supports the signiﬁcance of skill acquisition to
accumulate human capital, the importance of deepening of social contacts and signalling
willingness to perform. As far as the consumption model is concerned we ﬁnd no clear
statistical evidence for its validity.
Keywords: volunteering, voluntary labour supply, human capital accumulation, wage pre-
mium, altruism.
JEL classiﬁcation: J22, J24, J31, D64.1 Introduction
Economists usually assume positively sloped labour supply curves with reservation wages
diﬀerent from zero. In contrast to this view a considerable amount of labour is oﬀered
without monetary compensation in return throughout the economy. Neighbourly help or
other unpaid help for friends are good examples for the social phenomenon that people
donate time and eﬀort in the absence of monetary rewards. Moreover, there is a signiﬁ-
cant percentage of people who oﬀer voluntary work in numerous organisations worldwide.
Important ﬁelds of volunteering comprise social and health services, education and youth
work, culture and recreation, rescue organisations, politics, environmental and religious
services. Undoubtedly, volunteering contributes signiﬁcantly to the economy’s welfare that
would otherwise require paid resources.
The share of the population oﬀering formal voluntary labour varies strongly across
countries (Table1). Sweden exhibits the highest participation rate in Europe with a share
of 59 percent of all employed people who supply voluntary labour. It is followed by Slovakia
(55 percent) with a participation rate above 0.50. Denmark, Greece, Great Britain and
The Netherlands show participation rates between 0.41 and 0.49. Italy, Luxembourg,
Iceland, Malta, Slovenia, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Belgium and Finland have
values between 0.31 and 0.39. In Germany, Estonia, Spain, Belarus, Northern Ireland,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Latvia and France at least 21 percent of all employed people
participate in voluntary labour. The group of countries with the lowest participation rates
with values between 0.10 and 0.19 are Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland and
Lithuania. In the United States participation rates are stable around 0.30 in recent years
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). The important role of voluntary
activities for the social and economic life and the high participation rates necessitate a
thorough economic analysis of motives for voluntary labour supplied.
Since volunteering cannot be explained by traditional labour market theory we build
on a diﬀerent approach introduced by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987). According to this
approach volunteering can be conceived either as a consumption or as an investment good.
In the consumption model volunteering reﬂects a utility-bearing activity. Hence, a utility
maximising consumer will choose voluntary activities according to her preference structure
under a given income constraint. As will be argued later we comprehend intrinsic motives
in this consumption motive. Within the investment hypothesis voluntary activities cause
opportunity cost as time and eﬀort is devoted in order to increase someone’s income in
the paid labour market. Therefore, the level of income is determined by the amount of
voluntary labour supply.
1An empirical investigation of these models1 is confronted at least with the following
problems: First, the empirical analysis has to control for potential simultaneity between
income and the volunteering decision. Second, self selection of volunteers must be ex-
pected in the sense that volunteers diﬀer systematically to non-volunteers in (un)observed
characteristics. Third, it is diﬃcult to test comprehensively the underlying motives behind
the consumption and investment model.
In this paper we tackle these issues by use of advanced regression and propensity score
matching methods and thereby controlling for potential endogeneity caused by simultane-
ity and self selection. Based on Austrian Census data on volunteers in organisations we try
to identify evidence in support of the investment and/or the consumption model. More-
over, we test diﬀerent motives of volunteers in either approach. The proposal is innovative
as existing contributions limit their analysis on either the consumption or the investment
model and do not account for potential simultaneity. Furthermore, in contrast to existing
literature we measure volunteering in three dimensions: as a dichotomous variable, as
the number of hours individuals volunteer, and as the number of organisations they are
engaged with.
2 The Rationale of Volunteering
In this section the motives for volunteering are formally speciﬁed. Based on the consump-
tion model voluntary activities may appear as an argument in the following maximisation
problem of a utility function Ui for an individual i subject to an income and time constraint
max Ui(tL,tV ,C) s.t. C = w(T − tL − tV ) (1)
The fact that voluntary work is time consuming implies that for each oﬀered hour oppor-
tunity cost have to be accepted: The variables tL and tV represent the hours of leisure
activities and the hours spent for voluntary work. The variable C denotes conventional
consumption expenditures (numeraire). The income constraint is deﬁned by the product
of the wage rate w and the working hours T − tL − tV ≥ 0. The variable T stands for the
endowment of available time. Hence, by providing an additional hour of volunteering in-
dividual income is aﬀected. If the wage rate changes the allocation of time and, therefore,
income will change as well. An increasing (decreasing) wage rate will be associated with
a decline (increase) of voluntary work due to the substitutional relationship between paid
work and volunteering. If the wage rate has no inﬂuence on the amount of volunteering
this may either indicate a certain type of preference structure or invalidate the consump-
1The following analysis of volunteering concentrates on the supply side. On the demand side we assume
a perfectly elastic relationship for volunteers at zero wages.
2tion model. Therefore, the conclusion that a missing empirical correlation between wage
and volunteering undoubtedly indicates the irrelevance of the consumption model seems
premature since substitution and income eﬀects of a change in the wage rate may cancel
out. Based on the consumption model the following suppositions can be derived:
• Supposition 1: A signiﬁcant inﬂuence of income on volunteering supports the validity
of the consumption model.
• Supposition 2: Controlling for income the number of working hours is expected to
have a negative eﬀect on volunteering.
In contrast to the consumption model the main purpose of volunteering in the investment
model is accumulation of human capital. Hence, volunteering will increase future income
as voluntary workers acquire certain types of skills and create and develop networks which
are useful for their paid job. Whereas the consumption model can be formulated within
a static framework, the investment approach necessitates a dynamic structure. Therefore,
volunteering within the simplest form of an investment model is expressed as the outcome
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In this intertemporal optimisation problem an individual maximises her net present income
which is the integral of a production function f(•) over the time span [0,T]. The variable T
can be associated with the age of retirement. In the production function v(t) represents the
amount of volunteering activities, and h(t) denotes accumulated human capital. Whereas
an increase in volunteering will decrease the current income level, an increase in human
capital will raise future individual income. As indicated by g(v(t)) in the equation of
motion volunteering pays oﬀ in the sense that investment in volunteering today - although
reducing current income - will increase future human capital and, therefore, future income
levels. The depreciation of the human capital stock over time is denoted by δh(t). The
solution to this standard dynamic optimisation problem2 is the optimal time path of
volunteering which is characterised by high volunteering at the beginning of the time
span. Thereafter, voluntary labour supply decreases steadily over time. The optimal
volunteering time path follows a typical inverse U-shaped human capital curve. However,
the model does not necessarily predict that every individual would have an incentive to
oﬀer voluntary labour. If the loss in current income through volunteering is expected to
2This model is based on education decisions in the theory of human capital. For a good introduction,
see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
3be higher than future returns from volunteering the amount of voluntary labour comes
down to zero.
The function g(•) in (2) allows the discussion of diﬀerent investment-based motives
how volunteering may augment the stock of human capital. (i) One explanation for g(•)
is on-the-job training and the acquisition of useful skills resulting from volunteering in
organisations (Mueller, 1975). Volunteering may be used to learn job-speciﬁc require-
ments and acquire insider know-how to be utilised as a comparative advantage in future
recruitment. (ii) Volunteering enables the access to networks (Saloner, 1985) through
which people obtain better job opportunities, support through lobbying, or access to im-
portant information. (iii) The function g(•) can also be motivated by signalling motives:
Potential employees use their volunteering activities in order to demonstrate their ability
and willingness to perform, which means volunteering is used to ‘boost’ curricula vitae.
Katz and Rosenberg (2005) provide a theoretical model of volunteering associated with
signalling: volunteering individuals emit a signal of high productivity and cooperation
and are, therefore, more likely to be hired and to command a higher wage. (iv) Moreover,
volunteering may be interpreted as a temporary commitment combined with the idea that
monetary compensation will be obtained in the future when unpaid voluntary activities
reach a proﬁtable level (e.g. volunteering activities which are commercially sourced out to
the volunteer if a certain level of temporal burden is exceeded). Volunteering can then be
seen as a vehicle for the preparation of lucrative markets (see Cugno and Ferrero (2004)).
Obviously, the potential for this volunteering motive is substantially limited to certain
types of volunteering activities. (v) Given the fact that the stock of human capital will
depreciate faster for those who are (temporarily) not on the job, volunteering may be used
to compensate this decline of human capital (Mueller, 1975). In the dynamic setting above
the optimal response would, therefore, lead to higher amounts of voluntary activities over
time for those temporarily not on the job. Based on the investment model the following
empirically testable suppositions can be extracted:
• Supposition 3: A positive impact of volunteering on the level of income is expected.
This causal eﬀect allows the estimation of a wage premium the size of which is of
primary interest.
• Supposition 4: Based on the expectation that investment in human capital decreases
over time older people are expected to volunteer less then younger ones. A direct
eﬀect that older people proﬁt less from long-term beneﬁts derived from voluntary
work (e.g. beneﬁts of preserving resources in environmental organisations) may also
exist.
• Supposition 5: Since the acquisition of useful skills requires exercise the wage pre-
mium is expected to increase with the number of voluntary hours supplied. This
4positive inﬂuence is supported by further arguments. On the one hand the number
of voluntary hours may express an individual’s willingness to perform. On the other
hand additional voluntary hours might intensify the social contacts within the net-
work through which higher monetary payoﬀs can be expected (e.g. to get hold of
important information). However, an optimal number of volunteering hours can be
supposed beyond which the engagement in volunteering might appear counterpro-
ductive. Extensive volunteering might signal too little time for the paid job.
• Supposition 6: As far as other network arguments are concerned the wage premium
depends on the number of social contacts and, hence, the number of organisations
for which people volunteer.
• Supposition 7: The more inﬂuential and the broader the potential network of a
volunteering organisation the higher is the supposed wage premium.
• Supposition 8: In order to compensate for the loss of human capital unemployed
people and people willing to enter the labour force (again) will volunteer with a
higher probability and with a higher intensity than others.
3 Volunteering in the Literature
Obviously, volunteering is a complex phenomenon the explanation of which transcends
the limits of one single approach as diﬀerent disciplines such as psychology, sociology,
economics, anthropology and others oﬀer diﬀerent and sometimes contradictory insights
into the motives for volunteering (Ziemek, 2003; Katz and Rosenberg, 2005). The aim of
this paper is neither to provide a comprehensive theory of volunteering nor to invalidate
other disciplines. We rather try to identify economic explanations for voluntary labor
supply in organisations within the framework of the consumption and the investment
model and test those empirically.
The motivational reasons to explain volunteering behaviour can also be classiﬁed into
the following two groups: One group focuses on internal rewards due to intrinsic moti-
vation originating from helping others. Meier (2006) distinguishes three subcomponents
of intrinsic motivators: (i) People care about the recipients’ utility and beneﬁt from the
result of their eﬀort (Argyle, 1999); (ii) Volunteers enjoy their work per se and intrinsi-
cally beneﬁt from the act of volunteering (Deci, 1975; Frey, 1997; Deci and Ryan, 2000).
According to this voluntary activity may increase individual self-determination and con-
tribute to feelings of competence. (iii) Helping others triggers warm-glow beneﬁts as the
knowledge of conducing to a good cause is utility increasing (Andreoni, 1990). From an
economic point of view this intrinsic motives is covered by the consumption motive. The
5other group of motives does not refer to the enjoyment of volunteer behavior per se but
to the increase in utility due to extrinsic reward from volunteering. The act of volunteer-
ing per se is of secondary interest in this case, and the volunteers rather expect external
beneﬁts or payoﬀs. This group of motives can be subsumed under the investment model.
A comprehensive body of literature stresses altruistic motives for voluntary activities.
Even though diﬀerent concepts and explanations for altruism are provided in the liter-
ature, and an unambiguous classiﬁcation of altruistic motives does not exist, we argue
that the consumption model comprehends components of altruistic preferences. In their
criticism of a narrow self-interest assumption of traditional economic thought Frey (1997),
Frey and Goette (1999), Meier and Stutzer (2004), Govekar and Govekar (2002), and Stark
(1995) stress the importance of cooperation, caring for others and philanthropic attitudes
to explain individual behaviour (Stark, 1995). Two recent empirical papers conﬁrm the
importance of altruism in explaining volunteering: Hwang, Grabb and Curtis (2005) ﬁnd
that Americans are more likely than Canadians to mention altruistic rather than personal
reasons for joining voluntary organisations. Results by Cappellari and Turati (2004) sup-
port their theoretical predictions indicating that intrinsically motivated individuals are
more likely to volunteer than extrinsically motivated ones.
3.1 Volunteering as Consumption
Mueller (1975) analyses voluntary hours of women with special attention on altruistic
motives using OLS estimations. Another OLS estimation of voluntary hours is supplied
by Dye (1980). Whereas income remains insigniﬁcant in both analyses, empirical results
show a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence of private wealth on the provision of voluntary labour
in the latter one. Empirical evidence on volunteering based on the estimation of a sin-
gle equation is also presented by Schram and Dunsig (1981). This paper is restricted to
married women, uses an OLS estimation to explain the volunteering decision and ﬁnds a
negative inﬂuence of age on the probability to volunteer. Unger (1991) interprets volun-
teering as a self sacriﬁce with no apparent reward and ﬁnds empirical support for altruism
with volunteering to be motivated by a person’s perception of the needs of others in the
community.
Andreoni, Gale and Scholz (1996) apply a bivariate Probit model for the simultaneous
estimation of spending time and money and ﬁnd a net wage elasticity of voluntary labour
of -0.8. They show that changes in the opportunity cost of time have substantial eﬀects
on the provision of volunteer hours. The simultaneity between income and volunteering,
however, has not been addressed.
Based on a Probit estimation Schady (2001) ﬁnds a positive correlation between income
6on volunteering. This conﬁrms the results of Freeman (1997) who argues that volunteering
is a so-called ‘conscience-good’ meaning that people feel morally obligated to volunteer if
they are asked to do so. He shows that the rich are addressed to volunteer more frequently
since they are expected to be more productive than people with lower income. This might
explain the empirically measured positive inﬂuence of income on volunteering. However,
both studies do neither consider self-selection nor simultaneity problems. Bryant, Jeon-
Slaughter, Kang and Tax (2003) emphasise whether an individual was asked to volunteer
or not and control for potential selection bias. Although Carlin (2001) controls for self
selection and ﬁnds support for the consumption model, the problem of simultaneity is
ignored. Segal and Weisbrod (2002) are the the ﬁrst who stress the heterogeneity of
volunteering in empirical work. They use Probit estimations to explain volunteering in
health, education and religious services.
3.2 Volunteering as Investment
Only a few empirical articles attempt to explore the causal eﬀect of voluntary activities on
the wage rate. Using Canadian data Day and Devlin (1997) examine whether volunteering
generates a return in the paid labour market and whether this may help to explain part
of the male-female earnings gap. Not controlling for potential endogeneity of volunteering
they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive wage premium for male volunteers but not for volunteering
women. Using the same data Day and Devlin (1998) ﬁnd that on average volunteers
earn about 7 percent higher incomes than non-volunteers. The econometric speciﬁcation
neglects the possible bias due to endogeneity of volunteering and abstains from separate
estimations for men and women. Using improved data and a Heckman self selection
procedure Devlin (2000) ﬁnds a lower wage premium of about 4 percent. The most recent
contribution by Prouteau and Wolﬀ (2005) applies an endogenous switching regression
model to French data. Thereby, no statistically signiﬁcant wage premium for volunteers
can be found. The data is, however, restricted to volunteers who perform managerial
tasks.
3.3 A Combination of the Investment and Consumption model
Several papers try to consider both the consumption and investment model for volunteer-
ing. A positive inﬂuence of income on egoism motivation representing the consumption
model is found in Clary, Snyder and Stukas (1996). Neglecting simultaneity issues the
authors also argue that investment considerations play a less important role for volun-
teers with higher income levels. The empirical analysis in Menchik and Weisbrod (1987)
is based on Tobit estimations of voluntary hours supplied. However, the explanation of
7both consumption and investment motives by one single equation must be criticised from
an econometric perspective. Vaillancourt (1994) stresses that both consumption and in-
vestment play a role for individuals in their decision to volunteer. However, the employed
Probit estimation of the volunteering decision including usual socio-economic variables
may again be seen as a shortcoming of this empirical analysis. Day and Devlin (1996)
investigate whether government spending and voluntary work are substitutes or comple-
ments. They suspect the potential endogeneity of income in the volunteering decision,
attempt to control for it, but do not estimate a complete structural model. Their empiri-
cal results are in line with Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) and Vaillancourt (1994), however,
the shortcoming that simultaneity is not adequately addressed still adheres.
Even though single articles do distinguish between consumption and investment mo-
tives and also correct for self selection, the potential simultaneity between the decision to
volunteer and making income has not been adequately addressed in the literature.
4 Data
The following empirical analysis is based on survey data of the Upper Austrian Census
conducted in summer 2001. In supplement to the regular Census program with a sample
size of about 8000 a sub-sample of 2536 households was confronted with questions about
volunteering.3 In each household one person was interviewed at her place of residence.
In addition data of an accompanying postal survey among 904 Upper Austrian volunteers
(mainly volunteering for the Red Cross) have been made available. Income is measured
on a monthly base as net household income including all subsidies (e.g. child support)
in seven ranges of A C727 length each. The lowest interval indicates income below A C727.
We use interval midpoints and A C4,724 for the highest interval as income measures. Since
the empirical tests of Suppositions 1-8 necessitate personal income we restrict our analysis
to (self-)employed sole wage earners (household income equals personal income) which
reduces the sample size to 650 cases.
Standard labour economics uses hourly wage rates. Therefore, in accordance with a
traditional wage equation framework we have divided income by the monthly working
hours. As a consequence, this wage rate we will be used in the following econometric
analysis. Due to missing observations in several variables the sample further diminishes
to 421 observations. Out of these 421 observed individuals 162 persons volunteer, they
provide on average 29.55 hours per month and work for 1.48 organisations. Concern-
ing the type of the organisations (multiple answers possible) about half of all volunteers
3For a more detailed description of the survey, see Hackl and Pruckner (2003) or Altenstraßer et al.
(2002).
8(82 individuals or 50.6%) are engaged with a relief organization4. Political or cultural
organisations account for the second-largest group (40 volunteers or 24.7%). The third-
largest group consists of social or religious organisations (32 volunteers or 24.7%). Another
20 volunteers (12.4%) perform activities for sports or educational organisations, and 23
volunteers (14.2%) volunteer for other organisations. Although most of the voluntary
institutions in our data set are organised via a national umbrella organisation most of
volunteering is done at the place of residence and, therefore, shows a strong component of
local personal involvement. The decision to volunteer is motivated by a variety of factors
(multiple answers possible). The majority of volunteers (77.8%) agrees that ‘enjoyment’ is
an important reason for their volunteering. The other most frequently reported important
reasons are ‘sensible recreational activity’ (52.5%), ‘group/teamwork experience’ (48.8%)
and ‘social attitude’ (45.7%). The least frequently reported reasons are to ‘make a change
from the paid job’ (28.4%), ‘gives the feeling of being needed’ (27.8%), ‘professional or
personal development’ (25.3%), ‘personal acknowledgement’ (14.8%) and ‘fun with con-
tests’ (13.0%). With respect to these self-reported motivational factors of volunteers the
investment motive seems to be of second order importance.
Our data set on volunteering is cross sectional. The fact that we do not observe
individuals over time and have no data on the hitherto duration of volunteering activities
complicates the analysis of the investment motive with its inherent time consuming process
of human capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the data allow valuable insights into the
investment motive since several eﬀects of volunteering on human capital work immediately
(e.g. access to the infrastructure of the volunteering organisation, signalling of willingness
to perform). Moreover, the typical volunteer has been volunteering for many years and,
therefore, the human capital accumulation process is already observable in our data (e.g.
the average number of years people volunteer for the Red Cross in Austria is 9 years).
Based on these arguments the available data set is appropriate to validate the consumption
and investment hypotheses.
5 Estimation Strategy and Empirical Results
For the empirical test of our suppositions we have both estimated a wage equation using
OLS and the probability to volunteer by use of a Probit estimation in a ﬁrst step (see
Table2).5 Given that the probability to work for free is positively associated with income
we ﬁnd preliminary evidence for the validity of the consumption motive. Assuming the
reversed causal direction the signiﬁcant volunteer variable in the wage equation indicates
the existence of the investment motive with a wage premium of 23.6 percent. Obviously,
4From these 82 volunteers 68 work for the Red Cross.
5For a detailed description and calculation of all variables, see Table4.
9both equations neglect the consequences of presumable endogeneity with the potential to
invalidate the conclusions drawn on these two single equation results.
In order to cope with the obvious problem of causal interference and endogeneity we
apply an instrumental variable approach in which we ﬁrst analyse whether the consumption
and/or the investment model may explain voluntary labour supply at all. Subsequently,
we identify the respective underlying motives and mechanisms. We apply the following
system of equations:6
volunteering = α1 + β1 wage + γ1 X1 + u1
wage = α2 + β2 volunteering + γ2 X2 + u2
(3)
where wage is the hourly wage rate, X1 and X2 represent vectors of individual socio-
economic characteristics, and α, β and γ symbolise the coeﬃcients to be estimated. The
variables u1 and u2 denote the error terms. The variable volunteering is captured in
three diﬀerent dimensions: (i) a dichotomous variable volunteer is equal to one if the
individual volunteers and zero otherwise, (ii) the number of hours individuals volunteer
per month volunteerhours, and (iii) the number of organisations they are engaged with
#organisations.
Since tests for endogeneity strongly indicate the prevalence of simultaneity between
volunteering and the wage rate and self selection of volunteers we apply appropriate two-
step procedures for the estimation of simultaneous equation models.7
The distinctive data types of the volunteering variables require diﬀerent methods of
estimation. For the joint estimation of the dichotomous variable volunteer and ln(wage)
we employ a Two-Stage Probit Least Squares Estimation (2SProbitLS) proposed by
Maddala (1983, p. 244):
volunteer∗ = α11 + β11 ln(wage) + γ11 X11 + u11
ln(wage) = α21 + β21 volunteer + γ21 X21 + u21
volunteer = 1[volunteer∗ > 0]
(4)
The latent variable volunteerhours is censored at zero hours. Therefore, we use a Two-
Stage Tobit Least Squares Estimation (2STobitLS) and estimate the volunteering equa-
tions by an Amemyia Generalised Least Squares Estimator (AGLS) (Amemiya, 1978;
6Subscripts denoting individuals are omitted for simplicity.
7The empirical results of endogeneity tests will be discussed below.
10Newey, 1987) and the wage equation following Maddala (1983, p. 243):
volunteerhours∗ = α12 + β12 ln(wage) + γ12 X12 + u12
ln(wage) = α22 + β22 volunteerhours + γ22 X22 + u22
volunteerhours = max[0,volunteerhours∗]
(5)
The same estimation procedure is applied for the joint estimation of the censored variable
#organisations and ln(wage):
#organisations∗ = α13 + β13 ln(wage) + γ13 X13 + u13
ln(wage) = α23 + β23 #organisations + γ23 X23 + u23
#organisations = max[0,#organisations∗]
(6)
Both the wage and volunteering equations include a set of socio-economic variables such
as education, working experience, sex, family status, place of residence, and working hours
in the paid job.8 Since the number of minors cannot be included in the regressions due
to missing data we control for the number of household members. In addition the wage
equations contain whether a person works in shifts or not and whether she is a blue or
white collar worker. The volunteering equation is identiﬁed by the following exclusive
restrictions: whether or not an individual has been engaged in a club during childhood
and adolescence and whether or not the individual has a volunteering partner. Both vari-
ables are highly correlated with the individual’s decision to volunteer. Both variables are
not correlated with unobserved wage-enhancing characteristics. As far as the variable
partnervolunteers is concerned joint coordination of (leisure) time and imitation of part-
ner’s behaviour represent good reasons for the inﬂuence of the partner’s volunteering. It
is not obvious that the volunteering behaviour of the partner would be correlated with
the residual in the wage equation of the individual. For instance, if there is positive as-
sortative mating of unobserved wage enhancing characteristics of cohabiting partners, the
application of this instrument would be problematic. However, we do not ﬁnd literature
supporting the existence of assortative mating of unobserved wage enhancing characteris-
tics. In general, there has been little conclusive evidence favouring the assortative mating
hypothesis of observable characteristics (Liu and Zhang, 1999). As regards the variable
youthclub the innate ability of a child does not decide whether she participates in a youth
club in general. Given participation in youth clubs, however, the abilities and of course
preferences will determine the type of the youth club. The contact with club life and
companionship increases the probability to join volunteering organisations years later.
Recognising the value of youth clubs for the development of children it is not plausible
that children in youth clubs utilise these clubs to accumulate human capital and to build
8In the following analysis we implicitly assume that individuals choose the working hours in the paid
labour market before they decide on the amount of volunteering. For further discussion of the issue, see
Carlin (2001).
11social networks in order to ﬁnd better-paying jobs when they are grown up. With the
exception of wage instruments in the number of organisations equation, the validity of all
our instruments is approved by overidentiﬁcation tests with high probabilities (see lower
panel in Table3).
Table3 includes the estimation results for the three diﬀerent types of estimation models.
The lower panel includes the tests for endogeneity and tests for overidentiﬁcation. The
volunteering variables (volunteer, volunteerhours and #organisations) are correlated
with the structural error in the wage equation with a probability of 90.8 percent, 99.6
percent and 99.6 percent. Therefore, we have a strong evidence for the prevalence of the
presumed endogeneity of volunteering. Endogeneity of income in the volunteering equation
occurs with lower probabilities: 0.6 percent, 54.0 percent and 5.2 percent. Nevertheless,
we apply the instrument variable estimation strategy as well.
Estimation results show that volunteers receive a wage premium in the paid labour
market. Irrespective of the volunteering variable to be used and the applied estimation
technique volunteers earn a signiﬁcantly higher wage as compared to non-volunteers (Sup-
position 3). Whereas the wage premium for participating in voluntary work is on average
18.5 percent based on the 2SProbitLS model, the 2STobitLS regression estimates a
wage premium of 0.60 percent for one additional hour of voluntary labour per month, and
17.0 percent higher wages if an individual volunteers for an additional organisation. The
robust and highly signiﬁcant impact of volunteering on wages supports the importance
of the investment model to explain voluntary work. All other coeﬃcients in the wage
equations are of reasonable order of magnitude and show theoretically expected signs.
Uncommonly we do not observe a signiﬁcant wage diﬀerential between men and women,
which might result from observing single earners only.
In contrast to the investment motive we do not ﬁnd clear evidence for the validity
of the consumption model. The coeﬃcient of ln(wage) in the volunteering equation re-
mains insigniﬁcant in all three variants (Supposition 1). The same is true for the variable
workhours in two of the three volunteering equations (Supposition 2). In the volunteer
hours equation the number of working hours in the paid job enter statistically signiﬁcant
with a positive sign. Moreover, one should also bear in mind that endogeneity tests of
income in the volunteering equations suggest exogeneity of income in two out of three
cases. Given these results we get ambiguous evidence concerning the consumption model.
A series of papers based on single equation models of volunteering ﬁnds a clear-cut pos-
itive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of income on volunteering without testing and/or controlling
for potential endogeneity. These results are interpreted in support of the consumption
hypothesis (see Section 3). Given our ﬁndings this conclusion seems premature.
The impact of age on voluntary labour supply shows ambiguous results too. Given our
12ﬁndings that the amount of volunteering decreases with age up to 44 years, we ﬁnd further
evidence in support of the investment motive. The older an individual, the lower is her
investment in human capital and the smaller are the proﬁts from networks provided by
volunteering work (Supposition 4). On the other hand we observe increasing volunteering
activities for people older than 44 years, respectively. This contradicts the investment
model and provides evidence for the consumption model. The result is in line with Brend-
gens and Braun (2000) who ﬁnd that retired people are more altruistically motivated and
focus more on consumption. One possible explanation is that the motives for volunteering
change over time and people – as they get older – conceive volunteering as investment in
their mental and physical health (Thoits and Hewiit, 2001; Meier and Stutzer, 2004) or as
pure amusement.
Women, individuals residing in urban areas and people living in a partnership are less
likely to oﬀer voluntary labour.9 The fact that women volunteer signiﬁcantly less may be
explained by child care responsibilities and a higher engagement in informal help.10 The
inﬂuence of residing in an urban area can be explained by the diﬀerent social structure in
rural areas as compared to large cities with a stronger corporate attitude to be expected
in rural areas. This is supported by Smith (1994), Wuthnow (1998) and Wilson (2000).
Furthermore, the lack of alternative leisure activities in rural areas makes volunteering
more attractive and decreases opportunity cost of volunteering. The negative impact of
a cohabiting partner probably reﬂects tighter time constraints. Self employment is not
signiﬁcant. Whereas a volunteering partner increases the probability of own engagement
by 0.51 individuals who joined a club during childhood and adolescence volunteer increase
their probability to volunteer by 0.14. We do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact
of education which is in contrast to a number of studies ﬁnding a positive or even a
negative inﬂuence of education on formal labor supply (Busching, 1987; Clary, Snyder and
Stukas, 1996; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996; Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Gibson,
1999; Wilson, 2000). However, Omoto and Snyder (1993) and Wilson (2000) conﬁrm an
insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of education on informal volunteering.
An alternative method to regression analysis is provided by the matching method with
its focus on estimating the causal eﬀect of volunteering on the wage. One advantage of
matching is the fact that this method does not require instrumental variables for volun-
teering. We set up a counterfactual framework introduced by Rubin (1974): For individual
i with i = 1...N let wagei(1) denote the wage rate when she is volunteering (vi = 1)
and wagei(0) if she is not volunteering (vi = 0). If both wagei(1) and wagei(0) were
observable the wage premium could be calculated as wagei(1)−wagei(0), and we observe
9The changes in the the predicted probabilities as these dummy variables change from 0 to 1 are −0.19,
−0.27 and −0.12 (marginal eﬀects).
10For a comprehensive discussion of ﬁndings on gender diﬀerences in volunteer behaviour, see Wilson
(2000).
13the so-called treatment eﬀect of volunteering on the wage rate. Obviously, this situation
can never be observed in non-experimental studies, and we face the problem of missing
data. To overcome this problem matching methods compare two individuals in the data
who only diﬀer in their volunteer activity and coincide in their remaining socio-economic
characteristics X1. Diﬀerent treatment eﬀects can be estimated. The Average Treatment
Eﬀect ATE calculates the expected eﬀect of volunteering on the wage rate including every
individual in the population irrespective whether she volunteers or not:





(wagei(1) − wagei(0)) (7)
A second quantity of interest represents the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated ATT,
which averages the causal eﬀect of the treatment across the subpopulation of volunteers.
This is the average wage premium for those who actually volunteer:






(wagei(1) − wagei(0)) (9)
For obvious reasons, the procedure suﬀers from multi-dimensionality which can jeopardise
the matching strategy if many explaining variables have to be considered. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) propose Propensity Score Matching as an equivalent estimation strategy
which reduces the dimensionality problem. The so-called propensity score is the probability
of volunteering given the vector of socio-economic variables:
p(X1) ≡ Pr(v = 1|X1) (10)
Any standard probability model can be used to estimate the propensity score which acts
as an indicator for the similarity of individuals to be matched. In terms of the propensity
score the ATT can be written as11:
ATT ≡ E[E[wage(1) − wage(0)|p(X1),v = 1]] (11)
= E[E[wage(1)|p(X1),v = 1] − E[wage(0)|p(X1),v = 0]|v = 1] (12)
The validity of matching relies on the so-called confoundness condition which means that
the treatment assignment is independent of the outcomes conditional on the propensity
score. Obviously, the probability of observing individuals with identical propensity scores
tends to be zero. Hence, various methods are suggested for the deﬁnition of similarity from
11For more details on Propensity Score Matching, see Wooldridge (2002, ch. 18).
14which we apply Radius Matching, Kernel Matching, and Nearest Neighbour Matching.12
The explaining variables in the Probit estimation of the propensity score are similar
to the structural variables in Table3 except the wage which is the outcome of interest
in this counterfactual framework.13 With a range from 20.1 percent to 26.9 percent the
statistically signiﬁcant ATTs are higher than the wage premia obtained from the regression
analysis (see Table5). These results again indicate a positive causal eﬀect of volunteering
on the wage rate and conﬁrm the validity of the investment model.
Investment motives of volunteering
Subsequently, we explore the underlying motives behind the investment hypothesis in
more depth. In particular we are interested whether the number of voluntary hours sup-
plied and/or the number of organisations determine the wage premium. Whereas the num-
ber of volunteering hours can be associated with the acquisition of useful skills, the intensiﬁ-
cation of social contacts, and the opportunity to signal willingness to perform (Supposition
5), the number of organisations is attributed to the potential amount of social contacts
(Supposition 6). Looking at Table3 volunteering hours and the number of organisations
are highly signiﬁcant in explaining the wage premium. Nevertheless, these estimations do
not allow the isolation of the partial inﬂuence of #organisations (volunteerhours) since
the equation does not control for volunteerhours (#organisations). In a perfect setting
this would require the simultaneous estimation of the decision to volunteer, the number
or organisations, the volunteering hours and the wage rate.
Since the resulting system of equations seems empirically unmanageable we have cho-
sen the following procedure: after controlling for self selection into volunteering and the
potential simultaneity of volunteering and the wage rate we assume volunteering hours
and number of organisations to be exogenous. Hence, we suppose that once we have
controlled for the decision to volunteer the variables #organisations, volunteerhours,
(#organisations)2, and (volunteerhours)2 do not correlate with the structural error of
the wage equation. Therefore, we employ a 2SProbitLS estimation to explain simulta-
neously ln(wage) and volunteer where we include volunteerhours, (volunteerhours)2,
#organisations and (#organisations)2 in the second stage regression of the wage equa-
tion as exogenous variables.
The positive coeﬃcient for volunteerhours and the negative coeﬃcient for (volunteer
hours)2 in Table6 indicate a decreasing marginal rate of return of hours on the wage rate.
The maximal wage premium is given at 40 hours voluntary work per month. Though
not statistically signiﬁcant we also observe a decreasing marginal return of the number
12For details, see Becker and Ichino (2002).
13The results from the propensity score estimation are available upon request.
15of organisations with the maximum wage premium at 3.1 organisations. These empirical
ﬁndings support the idea that volunteering up to a certain amount of time might signal
ability and willingness to perform. However, if the optimal amount of volunteering hours
is exceeded employers could fear a lack of commitment in the paid job resulting in falling
wage premia. The coeﬃcients of the other variables in the wage equation show expected
signs and are very similar to the estimated models presented in Table3.
To gain further evidence on the underlying motives of the investment model we again
apply Propensity Score Matching. Within the group of volunteers three diﬀerent treat-
ments are designed: (i) Whether a person volunteers more than the sample median of
voluntary hours supplied. (ii) Whether a person volunteers more than the sample mean
of voluntary hours supplied. (iii) Whether a person volunteers for more than one organ-
isation.14 As indicated by the ATTs in Table7 an increase of working hours beyond the
sample median raises the wage by 24.4, 22.0 or 16.8 percent depending on the matching
estimator with the Kernel and Radius results being statistically signiﬁcant. With 21.2,
17.9 and 7.1 percent the corresponding values based on the ‘mean treatment’ are lower as
compared to the ‘median-treatment’. Given that the median of volunteerhours is smaller
than the mean we obtain a conﬁrmation of decreasing marginal returns of volunteerhours.
Again the Kernel and Radius methods provide statistically signiﬁcant ATTs. With a wage
premium from 7.2 percent (Kernel and Nearest Neighbor) to 8.1 percent (Radius) the treat-
ment based on the number of organisations provides lower results. However, these results
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Both the 2SProbitLS results from Table6 and the matching estimations (Table7)
conﬁrm a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of voluntary hours on the wage rate. Apparently, the ac-
quisition of useful skills and the intensiﬁcation of social contacts (facilitated by a high
number of voluntary hours) and their impact on human capital play an important role
for the explanation of volunteering behaviour. Signalling an individual’s willingness to
perform is another explanation concurring with this empirical evidence (Supposition 5).
The other suppositions based on the investment model cannot be supported by our
data: As far as the pure number of social contacts is concerned we have not found a
statistical inﬂuence of the number of organisations as shown above (Supposition 6). Hence,
it is not the amount of organisations and the associated quantitative number of potential
contacts which is important for networking – rather the existence of intensiﬁed social
contacts measured in volunteering hours seems decisive for the network motive to be
valid. Based on Supposition 7 we tested whether more inﬂuential and bigger organisations
would guarantee higher wage premia. Introducing various dummies for certain types of
organisations in our regression analyses we have not found statistical evidence for the
14The results from the three Probit estimations which have been used for the calculation of propensity
scores are available upon request.
16validity of Supposition 7. The same is true for Supposition 8 predicting a higher probability
to volunteer for unemployed people or people willing to enter the labour force again - we
do not ﬁnd according evidence.15
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have carried out all estimations for
the whole sample of all employed individuals. Thereby, we have increased our sample size
to 1,383 observations, but have switched from using the individual income to household
income. The results are very stable, and we observe the same pattern as for the sample
of single earners only.16
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyses motives for the decision to volunteer. The analysis is based on the
interpretation of volunteering as a common consumption good (consumption model) or as
a mean to increase an individual’s human capital (investment model). Whereas existing
literature provides evidence on the validity of these models, available empirical results
are ambiguous. Most of the available results must be questioned at least partly due to
methodological diﬃculties which are not considered adequately.
We present a solid empirical framework to address diﬀerent hypotheses on volunteering
decisions with appropriate econometric methods. The paper diﬀers from previous work by
• empirically controlling for potential simultaneity due to the interdependence between
income and the volunteering decision.
• accounting for self selection of volunteers since volunteers diﬀer systematically to
non volunteers in (un)observed characteristics determining income.
• investigating the underlying motives behind the investment model.
• measuring volunteering in three diﬀerent dimensions.
The consistency of results from the instrumental variables approach and the propensity
score matching allows the following summary: We ﬁnd statistical evidence for the invest-
ment model with a highly robust and signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of volunteering on the wage
15Regression results for Suppositions 7 and 8 are not reported in the paper but available upon request.
16The following plausible changes for the regression analysis are: (i) Lower wage premia, since the
change from the individual income to the household income decreases the eﬀect of volunteering. (ii) The
endogeneity of the income is more clear-cut, and the instrumental variables for income do not pass the
overidentiﬁcation tests. This result is plausible since the instruments are intended to work for individual
income. (iii) We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of income on all dimensions of volunteering. The last
result can either indicate the consumption motive if the household income is used as the relevant income
variable or may simply reﬂect the remaining endogeneity since the instruments perform poorly.
17rate. On average the wage premium for volunteering amounts up to 18.5 percent in the
regression analysis. Within the framework of the investment model it turns out that the
number of volunteering hours plays an important role in explaining the wage premium.
This supports the signiﬁcance of skill acquisition to accumulate human capital, the impor-
tance of deepening of social contacts and signalling willingness to perform. However, no
evidence is found for other motives associated with the investment model. The quantita-
tive number of social contacts measured by the number of organisations does not generate
a wage premium.
As far as the consumption motive is concerned we do not ﬁnd clear statistical evi-
dence for its validity. However, even in the absence of a signiﬁcant impact of income on
volunteering, we cannot rule out the validity of the consumption model. A certain type
of preference structure might explain this outcome as well (e.g. quasi-linear preferences,
substitution and income eﬀects might cancel). In addition we ﬁnd some evidence that
people seem to change their motives for volunteering over time: When people grow older,
they may oﬀer voluntary labour in order to preserve their mental and physical health or
to enjoy themselves.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The strong evidence for the
investment model with its signiﬁcant inﬂuence of volunteering on the wage rate requires
the inclusion of volunteering variables in the estimation of wage equations. From an
individual’s perspective the existence of the wage premium is an important determinant of
the decision to volunteer. Hence, our results can further be exploited as a striking argument
in the recruitment process of volunteers for several organisations. Moreover, the results
may challenge previous empirical ﬁndings on volunteering. Many papers report a positive
and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of income on the volunteering decision without adequately taking
endogeneity based on self selection and simultaneity into account. Therefore, it remains
open whether this positive inﬂuence is in support of the consumption model or occurs as a
result of econometric misspeciﬁcation. We oﬀer a promising procedure for the appropriate
analysis of unpaid labour and take into account the underlying econometric structure of
this type of labour supply – an approach which could successfully be implemented for
panel data which allows the calculation of individual ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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The Netherlands 0.49 551






























a Own calculations based on data from the European
Values Survey (EVS) for the year 1999 (employed in-
dividuals only). The EVS contains information on ba-
sic attitudes, beliefs and human values covering reli-
gion, morality, politics, work and leisure. In all coun-
tries representative national samples were interviewed.
Obs. is the number of available observations.
23Table 2: Single Equation Results for Volunteering and Incomea



































McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.225
a In each estimation the number of observations is 421. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent
level, 5-percent level and 1-percent level.












ln(wage) 0.730 56.067 0.774
(0.956) (37.680) (1.510)
school 0.057 0.020 0.058 -1.499 0.059 0.035
(0.013)*** (0.081) (0.017)*** (3.137) (0.016)*** (0.124)
exper 0.021 -0.081 0.028 -3.928 0.016 -0.062
(0.009)** (0.030)*** (0.013)** (1.063)*** (0.010) (0.039)
(exper)2 -0.0004 0.002 -0.001 0.073 -0.0003 0.001
(0.0002)** (0.0006)** (0.0003)*** (0.023)*** (0.0002) (0.0008)
selfemployed 0.149 -0.543 0.200 -25.132 0.178 -0.702
(0.106) (0.377) (0.408) (15.302) (0.252) (0.500)
female -0.013 -0.507 0.055 -21.310 0.042 -0.782
(0.060) (0.196)*** (0.081) (7.600)*** (0.082) (0.281)***
partner 0.087 -0.326 0.116 -16.789 0.092 -0.398
(0.048)* (0.175)* (0.060)** (6.719)** (0.060) (0.246)
urban 0.140 -0.764 0.133 -22.145 0.190 -1.123
(0.050)** (0.161)*** (0.071)* (6.146)*** (0.083)** (0.222)***
workhours -0.016 0.014 -0.018 1.201 -0.017 0.020
(0.003)*** (0.018) (0.004)*** (0.710)* (0.005)*** (0.027)
shift worker 0.108 0.095 0.124
(0.051)** (0.056)* (0.054)**
household members 0.039 0.031 0.041
(0.018)** (0.022) (0.024)*
blue collar -0.072 -0.031 -0.031
(0.053) (0.064) (0.066)
partner volunteers 1.412 30.263 1.398
(0.412)*** (13.613)** (0.518)***
youth club 0.391 12.092 0.608
(0.192)** (7.548) (0.278)**
constant 1.926 -1.698 1.883 -119.425 1.915 -2.360
(0.227)*** (1.852) (0.290)*** (72.093)* (0.283)*** (2.837)




ln(wage) 0.994e 0.460f 0.948f





ln(wage) 0.190 0.581 0.078
a In each estimation the number of observations is 421 (employed single earners only). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level and 1-percent level. b The estimation
is carried out by using Keshk (2003). c Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1000 replications. d P-value of the
Wu-Hausman statistic (Baum, Schaﬀer and Stillman, 2003). e P-value of a test according to Rivers and Vuong (1988); see
also Wooldridge (2002, Chap. 15, Procedure 15.1). f P-value of a test according to Smith and Blundell (1986); see also
Wooldridge (2002, Chap. 16, Procedure 16.1). g P-value of Sargan statistic (Sargan, 1958).
25Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean S.D.
bluecollar
One if the individual is a blue collar worker and zero if she is
a white collar worker. 0.31 0.46
exper Age minus the years of schooling minus six. 21.41 10.42
female One if the individual is female. 0.39 0.49
householdmembers Number of household members 2.03 1.40
ln(wage)
Ln of the individual hourly wage rate (= monthly income di-
vided by monthly working hours) 2.27 0.48
partner One if the individual has a partner 0.51 0.50
partnervolunteers One if the individual has a volunteering partner 0.08 0.27
school Years of schooling 11.58 1.92
self-employed One if the individual is self-employed 0.04 0.20
shiftworker One if the individual is a shift worker 0.21 0.41
urban One if the individual resides in an urban area 0.31 0.46
workhours Hours of paid work per week 39.16 7.87
youthclub
One if the individual was a club member during her adoles-
cence 0.71 0.46
volunteer One if the individual volunteers 0.38 0.49
volunteerhours Hours of voluntary work per month 11.37 23.87
#organisations Number of organisations people volunteer for 0.57 0.85
Table 5: ATT of Volunteering on the Hourly Wage Ratea
Method of Matching ATT t-value
b number of number of
treated tontrols
Kernel 26.9% 5.610 162 259
Radius 25.2% 4.978 162 247
Nearest Neighbour 20.1% 2.632 162 89
a The number of observations is 421 (employed single earners only). The sample
includes 162 individuals with and 259 without treatment. The outcome variable
ist the logarithm of the hourly wage rate. We restrict the matching to the area of
common support. The estimation follows Becker and Ichino (2002). b The underlying
standard errors are bootstrapped.











































a The number of observations is 421 (employed single earn-
ers only). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthe-
ses (1000 replications). *, ** and *** indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level and
1-percent level. Due to the assumption of conditional ex-
ogeneity the variables volunteerhours, (volunteerhours)2,
#organisations and (#organisations)2 are included in the
second stage regression only.
27Table 7: ATT of Volunteering more Hours than the Sample Median/Mean
and of Volunteering for more than one Organization on the Hourly Wage Ratea
Method of Matching ATT t-value number of number of
treated controls
volunteer hours > medianb
Kernele 24.4% 2.915 71 91
Radius 22.0% 2.433 70 79
Nearest Neighbour 16.8% 0.912 71 29
volunteer hours > meanc
Kernele 21.2% 2.867 63 99
Radius 17.9% 2.013 63 91
Nearest Neighbour 7.1% 0.530 63 33
#organisations > 1d
Kernele 7.2% 0.891 56 106
Radius 8.1% 0.845 51 87
Nearest Neighbour 7.2% 0.529 56 35
a The number of observations is 421 (employed single earners only). The outcome
variable ist the logarithmus of the hourly wage rate. We restrict the matching to
the area of common support. The estimation follows Becker and Ichino (2002).
b The sample includes 71 individuals with and 91 without treatment. The median
of volunteer hours is equal to 20. c The sample includes 99 individuals with and 63
without treatment. The mean of volunteer hours is equal to 29.55. d The sample in-
cludes 56 individuals with and 106 without treatment. The mean of #organisations
is equal to 1.48. e The underlying standard errors are bootstrapped.
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